While compensation consultants are known to play an important role in the design of executive compensation contracts, prior research on the effect of compensation consultants and their incentives on CEO pay has provided mixed findings. In December 2009, the SEC required firms to disclose fees paid for executive compensation consulting (EC service) and other services (non-EC service) under certain circumstances. Using 3,198 compensation consultant engagements and 576 executive compensation consulting fee observations from S&P 1500 firms for fiscal years 2009 to 2011, we examine whether fees paid to executive compensation consultants (both EC and non-EC fees) are related to greater levels of CEO compensation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compensation awarded to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has been a field of interest for many years. Many researchers have studied the factors that determines the compensation levels, whether they are optimal, and whether they are excessive, as asserted by many critics. While through what process and by whom the compensation is determined is an important factor to consider, however, the role that compensation consultants plays in the compensation-related decision making has received relatively little attention from researchers in the past due to data unavailability.
Over the past several years, compensation consultants have played an increasingly important role in helping boards set and determine executive compensation (Higgins 2007) . Such an increase in the use of compensation consultants is largely due to the increased demands for companies to align executive pay with shareholder interest. The compensation committee of the board or the management of the company routinely engages with compensation consultants to receive advice on executive compensation design. (Cadman et al. 2010; Murphy and Sandino 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012) . Consultants are experts on compensation practice issues, such as relevant regulations, market trends, and benchmark information. Many consultants accumulate their own proprietary data on executive pay level and compensation practices across different industries, allowing them to suggest the optimal pay level considering the firm and its peer group performance (Cadman et al. 2010) . With these expertise, consultants are able to effectively consider different forms of compensation packages and advice the board or the company with optimal pay levels (Brancato 2002 ).
There also exists, however, criticisms on the services provided by compensation consultants (e.g., Waxman 2007) . While consultants' advices may seem as if they are intended to design effective executive compensation schemes, critics assert that their potential conflict of interest may bias their advices to secure additional revenues from non-executive compensation service (non-EC) such as advice on pension plans and executive compensation (EC) consulting service, suggesting that CEOs could receive higher levels of compensation than warranted by performance as a result.
Prior research has identified two types of potential conflicts of interest facing compensation consultants, which can lead to providing biased advice. First is the incentive to secure revenue by retaining the EC services to the clients, known as the "repeat business" incentives (Cadman et al. 2010; Murphy and Sandino 2010) . Furthermore, while some compensation consultants are small firms that focus exclusively on providing executive compensation services, many are large consulting companies that also provide services unrelated to executive compensation, such as actuarial and employee pension plan design. Compensation consultants' incentive to earn additional revenue from these non-EC services is called the "cross-selling" incentives. As the CEO can (ultimately) decide the NEC Service provider, consultants may be inclined to recommend excessive compensation for the incumbent CEO. This cross-selling incentive can cause consultants to recommend higher than appropriate level of compensation to the incumbent CEO, who retains the ultimate decision rights to award them the non-EC services.
The conflicting role of compensation consultants has increasingly caught the attention of regulators and shareholders. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2006 required companies to disclose whether they retain executive compensation consultants, and whether consultants are employed directly by the board or the company. Furthermore, the SEC strengthened the regulation in December 2009 by requiring firms to disclose fees paid for both EC and non-EC services under certain circumstances. However, critics against the fee disclosure requirement argue that such regulations are imposed without scientific evidence and therefore are excessive imposition on companies' disclosure practices. Prior academic evidence on whether conflicted compensation consultants recommend more generous executive pay packages has also produced mixed results (Conyon et al. 2009; Cadman et al. 2010; Murphy and Sandino 2010) .
In this paper, we re-examine whether compensation consultant's own incentives affect the CEO pay level by utilizing consulting fee data that became available after the SEC's 2009 regulation. We hand-collect 3,198 consultant engagement observations and 576 EC fee data from annual proxy statements from fiscal year 2009 to 2011. While there exist a few studies on the relationship between compensation consultant incentives and CEO pay (Conyon et al. 2009; Cadman et al. 2010; Murphy and Sandino 2010) , most of them fail to find strong evidence of biased consultant advice due to conflict of interest. Nonetheless, prior studies have relied on the data in 2006, thereby lacking any direct fee information and resorting to indirect proxies for consultants' conflict of interest. Specifically, these prior studies mostly have used a simple indicator variable to identify conflicted consultants, which therefore fall short of capturing the full implications of compensation consultants' repeat business and cross-selling incentives.
Therefore, we re-visit the initial arguments made by the Waxman Report and test whether compensation consultants' conflict of interest, proxied by services fees paid, are positively associated with CEO pay levels.
Unlike prior studies that find no support for repeat business hypothesis, we find strong empirical supports for repeat business hypothesis, suggesting that consultants recommend higher cash, equity, and total compensation when they receive higher EC fees. In contrast to Murphy and Sandino (2010) but consistent with Conyon et al. (2009) and Cadman et al. (2010) , we find limited evidence that the level of total compensation is higher when non-EC fees are higher, providing little support for cross-selling hypothesis. These results are robust to controlling for potential selection bias issues arising from the prior decision to retain a consultant, mandatory fee disclosure requirement only under some circumstances, and inclusion of both mandatory and voluntary fee disclosing firms.
In order to examine whether our results supporting repeat business hypothesis are driven by abnormally high EC fees paid, we build on the literature on the relation between auditor independence and audit quality (Kinney and Libby 2002; Choi et al. 2010) . Specifically, we derive the abnormal EC fees based on the determinants of EC fees, and then analyze the relationship between CEO pay and abnormal EC fees, which would be a proxy for the economic bond between the consultant and client. We expect the relationship between abnormal EC fees and CEO pay to be positive when EC fees are higher than expected, since excessive EC fees can increase consultants' incentive to recommend more generous pay. Consistent with our expectation, the regression results indicate that abnormally high EC fees are positively associated with CEO's total and cash compensation. Overall, the findings from our study challenge the findings of prior studies such as Conyon et al. (2009 ), Cadman et al. (2010 , and Murphy and Sandino (2010) who find no evidence that repeat business incentive of a firm's compensation consultant is associated with higher level of CEO pay.
This study contributes to the executive compensation literature. First, this study extends the compensation consultant literature and examines the role of a crucial advisor in designing the compensation package. While vast prior research has addressed factors related to the effect of economic, governance, and executive characteristics on executive pay, there is still scare direct evidence on the effect of outside compensation consultants. Second, this study also contributes to the literature on whether conflicted consultants contribute to greater levels of CEO pay. Using direct proxies for repeat business and cross-selling incentives of consultants, we re-investigate the findings of other studies on incentives of conflicted compensation consultants (Conyon et al. 2009; Cadman et al. 2010; Murphy and Sandino 2010) and provide novel evidence that both the level of EC fees and abnormal EC fees are positively associated with higher levels of CEO pay, thereby lending support to "repeat business" hypothesis that prior research finds no support for.
We begin in Section II with background information, prior literature and hypotheses development. Section III reports the sample and measures used in the study. Section IV provides empirical models and results on the association between compensation consultant incentives and CEO pay, and Section V concludes.
II. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS

Prior Literature
A report issued by the Corporate Library in October 2007 titled "The effect of compensation consultants" (Higgins 2007) argues that executive pay levels are significantly higher for companies that hire compensation consultants and such pay levels do not appear to relate to increased shareholder return. Another report issued in December 2007 by the US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform titled "Executive Pay:
Conflicts of interest among compensation consultants" (Waxman 2007) , also known as the "Waxman Report", suggests that compensation consultants' conflicts of interest is problematic, especially since non-EC fees are usually significantly greater than EC fees. The report is based on proprietary data obtained directly from six leading CCs that provide EC and non-EC services to Fortune 250 companies between fiscal year 2002 and 2006. It documents that the average annual EC fee for the sample is $220,000 while the non-EC fee is over $ 2.3 million and that firms with higher ratio of non-EC fees to EC fees have higher median executive pay than other firms.
The SEC's 2006 requirement has made data on compensation consultants accessible, motivating several studies on the conflicting interests of compensation consultants. Using 1,046 US and 124 Canadian firms that retained compensation consultants during the fiscal year 2006, Murphy and Sandino (2010) examine the effect of repeat business and the cross-selling incentives of compensation consultants on CEO pay. They test the repeat business incentives by examining whether CEO pay is related to managerial influence over the decision to appoint compensation consultants, proxied by whether the consultant is engaged exclusively by the board or by the management. Inconsistent with their hypothesis, the result suggests that CEO pay is actually higher when the consultant works for the board rather than the management, rejecting the repeat business hypothesis. To test for the effect of cross-selling incentives, they use an indicator variable on whether the firm also receives actuarial or other services from the same consultant for the US firms and voluntarily disclosed EC and non-EC fee information for a small number of Canadian firms. They find that CEO pay is indeed higher when compensation consultants provide additional services. Cadman et al. (2010) also tests for the potential cross-selling incentives using 755 firms from S&P 1500 for fiscal year 2006. They use three proxies for conflicts of interest, namely voluntary non-EC service disclosures made by companies, engagement with other than Fredrick W. Cook or Pearl Meyer, consultants that exclusively provide EC services only, and significant non-audit services indicating a willingness to allow possible conflicts of interests among professional service providers. Overall, inconsistent with the Waxman Report (2007) and Murphy and Sandino (2010) , Cadman et al. (2010) fail to find widespread evidence of higher pay levels in client firms hiring consultants with greater cross-selling incentives. They also find no support for repeat business hypothesis using an indirect proxy for client importance.
In contrast, Armstrong et al. (2012) investigate the effect of governance in the relationship between CEO pay and compensation consultant engagement. Using 2,110 firms in fiscal year 2006, they find that CEO pay is higher in firms with weaker corporate governance, and those firms are more likely to have hired compensation consultants. Although use of compensation consultants leads to higher CEO pay, the effects disappear when governance characteristics are controlled, indicating that weak governance explains much of the higher pay in companies with consultants. Furthermore, they find no evidence that CEO pay is higher when firms hire multiservices consulting firms instead of boutique firms specializing in EC service. Using UK firms, Conyon et al. (2009) also find little evidence that hiring consultants supplying other services to client firms leads to higher levels of CEO pay.
Overall, these studies suggest that the repeat business incentive of compensation consultants is not associated with the level of CEO pay, while evidence on the effect of cross-selling incentives is mixed. In consistent with the Waxman Report (2007) and Higgins (2007) , extant evidence is consistent with compensation consultants not compromising their role as an expert advisor despite potential conflicts of interests. This is also consistent with the auditing literature on whether the provision of non-audit services compromise auditor independence (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003) . However, these studies are based on the SEC's 2006 that lacks fee information and thus employ indirect proxies for consultants' conflict of interest.
Specifically, the aforementioned studies mostly use a simple indicator variable to identify conflicted consultants, thus falling short of capturing the full implications of compensation consultants' repeat business and cross-selling incentives.
Other studies examine the impact of consultant switch on level and structure of CEO pay.
Using a sample of large UK firms, Goh and Gupta (2010) document that firms switching their main compensation consultant receive a higher yet less risky compensation, consistent with firms successfully engaging in opinion-shopping. Chu et al. (2015) find that after 2009 fee disclosure rules (which we will discuss below), CEO pay is higher in firms that switched to specialist EC consultants than firms that remained with multi-service consultants.
Research Question
Although prior literature overall suggests that compensation consultants' potential conflict of interest is not related to CEO pay level, those results are based on indirect proxies for incentives of conflicted compensation consultants. With the new fee disclosure requirement by the SEC, we are able to empirically verify whether prior findings on the effect of consultants' incentives on CEO pay remain unchanged is largely an empirical issue.
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In the US, the only study that utilizes the EC and non-EC consulting fees is the Waxman Report, which provides univariate evidence of higher CEO pay when firms hire consultants with greater conflicts of interest. Therefore, we re-visit the initial arguments made by the Waxman Report and test whether compensation consultants' conflicts of interests, proxied by actual fees paid for their services, are positively associated with CEO pay levels.
H:
Higher consulting fees paid to compensation consultants are positively related to the level of CEO pay 1 For example, numerous auditing studies have started examining whether non-audit services compromises auditor independence since the SEC's audit and non-audit fees disclosure requirements in 2001 (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kullapur 2003) . In December 2009, the SEC further expanded the regulation by requiring companies to disclose fees earned by providing both executive compensation and unrelated services under certain circumstances. Specifically, if the board or the compensation committee is advised by compensation consultant on the pay level or compensation package design, and if the consultant or its integrated affiliates provide non-EC services and these non-EC fees exceed $120,000, then the firms should disclose the total fees (both EC and non-EC fees) related to all services provided. The rule also requires companies to disclose whether the decision to engage the consultant or its non-EC services are made or recommended by the company's management, and whether the board or compensation committee approves such non-EC services. If the board and the company's management endorse different compensation consultants, then no fee disclosure is required. Finally, general services involving only non-discretionary plans not specifically [Insert Figure 1 About Here]
III. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND SAMPLE
The Impact of the Fee Disclosure Requirement on the Compensation Consultant Industry Murphy and Sandino (2010) predict that the 2009 SEC fee disclosure regulations will impact the selection of compensation consultants in largely two ways. First, firms may stop using compensation consultants for non-EC services to avoid fee disclosure. Second, firms may hire two or more consultants, one to provide EC services to the board and the other to the management. Chu et al. (2015) indeed document that consultant turnover and the number of specialist firms has dramatically increased after the 2009 SEC fee disclosure regulation.
Interestingly, they also provide evidence that CEO pay is higher in firms that switched from a multi-service consultant (e.g., Towers Perrin) to a specialist consultant (e.g., Pay Governance LLC) than in firms that stayed with a multi-service consultant. They interpret their findings as suggesting that 'switchers' are the ones who give additional services to multi-service EC consultants in exchange for more favorable compensation packages for CEOs and executives.
The above discussion implies that mandatory disclosures requirements could alter firms' decisions to use consultants for EC and non-EC service. To the extent that the new fee disclosure rules affect firms' strategic choice of consultant, firms that previously hired conflictedconsultants for rent-seeking activities could actively switch to specialist consultants to avoid disclosing both EC and non-EC consulting fees under the new regulation. Consequently, our 2 In June 2012, the SEC adopted additional rule directing the national securities exchanges to adopt certain listing standards related to the compensation committee as well as compensation consultants, as required by the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This rule modified existing rules to require disclosure by eliminating the disclosure exception for services on broad-based plans and non-customized benchmark data, but it did not make any change to the conditional fee disclosure requirements. findings based on fee information after the new rules in 2009 might understate both the extent of consultants' repeat business (since switchers don't need to disclose fees) and cross-selling incentives (firms that stayed with multi-service consultants are likely to have hired multi-service consultants for reasons unrelated to managerial rent-seeking) in periods prior to this new disclosure regulation.
Sample Construction
We hand-collect the compensation consultant fees for executive compensation and other that retain compensation consultants for executive compensation services, and among them 2,830 firm-year observations either do not engage in any non-EC service or the non-EC fees are less than $120,000. There is a total of 368 firm-year observations utilizing both EC and non-EC consulting services, with non-EC services fee exceeding $120,000 (subject to mandatory EC and non-EC fee disclosure). There are additional 208 observations with voluntary EC service fee disclosure. Our final sample is comprised of 576 observations with available EC fee disclosure and 433 observations with available non-EC fee disclosure. Panel A of Table 1 explains the sample selection process and Panel B of Table 1 shows the sample composition of EC and non-EC fee disclosures. 3 List of companies that make up the S&P 1500 can change on a daily basis as the companies are listed or delisted as they grow, or are acquired, or fail.
Panel C of Table1 provides a breakdown of five different types of consultant engagement.
Four percent of the total sample hire multiple consultants (Multiple Consultants), a situation where the primary consultant is hired by the committee but an additional consultant is separately hired by the management (Type V). We also identify the case, "consultant works exclusively for the board" (Board Engagement, Type I and II) where the firm does not explicitly state that the consultant works for the management or that an additional consultant is separately engaged by management. Murphy and Sandino (2010) use a narrower scope of board engagement in which the consultant reports only to the board. In our sample, 95 percent of the consultants are described as "work exclusively for the compensation committee or board". On the other hand, the management of Motorola Solutions did not engage any EC consultant, but hired non-EC service provider, Deloitte Consulting. That is, the non-EC fee of Motorola Solutions' EC consultant was zero. Therefore, Motorola Solutions voluntarily disclosed its EC fee and this case can be identified as Type II (multiple consultants engaged by committee). Since the EC service from Compensia Advisory Patners is the primary CEO compensation consulting one, we regard the EC fee of Compensia Advisory Patners ($290,342) as EC fee in our sample.
We also take zero value of NEC fee which equals to the non-EC fee of the primary EC 4 Murphy and Sandino show that only 41 percent of the consultants work exclusively for the compensation committee or board, rather than for the management. consultant.
[Insert Table 1 About Here]
Proxies for Compensation Consultant Incentive
The key predictor variables in the regressions are the consultant incentive variables. We employ several proxies for consultant incentives from prior literature on compensation consultants and auditor independence. First, following Cadman et al. (2010) and Murphy and Sandino (2010), we create an indicator variable (NEC Service) on whether compensation consultants provide non-EC services to a client firm under the assumption that firms that do not disclose EC or non-EC fees do not receive any additional non-EC service. (2,613 observations in our sample). Nonetheless, we are unable to fully rule out the possibility that these firms may have received non-EC services costing less than $120,000.
Second, in line with Kinney and Libby (2002) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) , we take advantage of fees paid for non-EC services (NEC Fee) to test the cross-selling incentives hypothesis, where higher non-EC fees are expected to increase consultants' incentive to secure their revenues by recommending excessive pay to CEOs, who retain the decision right to change non-EC service providers. EC fees (EC Fee) are used to test the repeat business hypothesis, where higher fees would increase consultants' incentive to be reappointed and thereby responding with recommending higher CEO pay. We also test the effect of total fees (Total Fee), the sum of EC and non-EC fees, since Ashbaugh et al. (2003) argue that total fees best captures the explicit economic bond between the consultant and client.
Third, following Frankel et al. (2002) , Waxman (2007) , Cadman et al. (2010) , and Murphy and Sandino (2010), we test whether the fee ratio between EC and non-EC fees have any effect on CEO pay as a proxy for the cross-selling incentives of consultants. We define the fee ratio (Fee Ratio) as non-EC fees divided by EC fees as a proxy for capturing relative monetary value of EC and non-EC services provided by the consulting firm to a client.
Fourth, in an attempt to test repeat business hypothesis with a more powerful measure, we construct a measure of abnormal EC fees (Residual) by estimating the expected level of EC fees, which we explain in section IV. In the audit literature, "abnormal fees may more accurately be likened by attempted bribes" (Kinney and Libby 2002, 109) , and therefore can better capture economic rents arising from auditor-client relationship than actual fees (Choi et al. 2010 ).
Abnormal fees reflect additional revenue received beyond consideration of firms' economic and governance characteristics, indicating that such fees are obtained for idiosyncratic relationship between compensation consultants and their clients. We further define positive and negative abnormal EC fees to test how higher-than or lower-than-expected fees affect consultants' decision to bias their executive compensation services. We expect that positive abnormal EC fees are indicative of revenues that consultants can receive beyond their normal level of effort, thereby increasing their incentive to secure an existing relationship with a client firm. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentile. In our sample, 433 firm-year observations disclose non-EC fees and average non-EC fees are $1,442,000. The mean disclosed EC fee for the 576 firm-years is $164,000 which amounts to 11 percent of the average NEC fee. Thus, the average Fee Ratio which is defined as NEC Fee divided by EC Fee is about 12. In contrast, the Waxman Report [Insert Table 2 About Here]
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS
Summary Statistics
Empirical Method
To examine the impact of compensation consultant incentives on the level of CEO pay, we model CEO compensation as a function of various measures of compensation consultant incentives after controlling for CEO, compensation consultant, and firm characteristics influencing CEO pay. The regression model is as follows companies, leverage ratio (Leverage) shows financial condition of companies, book-to-market ratio (Btm) indicates companies' complexities and growth opportunities. We define firm's accounting performance as return on assets (Roa) and negative net income (Loss), and stock price performance as stock returns (Return). Roa is measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to book value of total assets at the beginning of the year. Stock return volatility (Return Volatility) serves as a proxy for a noisier environment.
We include the variable regarding the consultant selection process. Management can hire an additional consultant to attain its own information or to be advised on director compensation.
CEO pay could be higher in firms with multiple consultants (Multiple Consultants) since the decision to hire multiple consultants may be related to firms' incentives to avoid disclosing fees and to cloak higher CEO pay (Cadman et al. 2010; Murphy and Sandino 2010) . (2) is based on 433 mandatory and voluntary fee disclosure observations that reported non-zero non-EC fees and remaining 2,765 observations that were assumed to have zero non-EC fees. Consistent with our finding with the NEC Service indicator, CEO total pay level is not correlated with the non-EC fees in Column (2). However, the result using the non-EC fee disclosure sample based on 433 observations in Column (3) indicates that higher non-EC fees is associated with greater CEO pay, lending some support to the cross-selling incentives argument. Taken together, the results in Columns (1) through (3) provide only limited evidence that compensation consultants' cross-selling incentives are associated with more lucrative CEO pay.
Results for the Impact of Compensation Consultant Incentives on CEO Total Pay
Column (4) shows the empirical results using EC fees as the independent variable. The result indicates that higher EC fees paid to consultants leads to higher CEO total pay. This evidence supports the notion that when compensation consultant receives higher EC fees (i.e., they have greater incentive to secure future business with the clients), the consultants are more inclined to provide biased advice and in turn recommend greater level of CEO pay. This finding is in contrast with Cadman et al. (2010) and Murphy and Sandino (2010) , who fail to find evidence that repeat business incentives of compensation consultants are related to the level of CEO pay.
In line with Kinney and Libby (2002) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003) , who advocate the use of total fee as a proxy for economic bonding between an auditor and a firm, the result in Column (5) suggests that total fee (sum of EC and non-EC fee for 424 firm-years disclosing both EC and non-EC fees) is also positively associated with the level of CEO total pay. Unlike Murphy and Sandino (2010) who report a positive relation between Fee Ratio and CEO pay using voluntary EC and non-EC fee disclosures from a small number of Canadian firms, the coefficient on Fee Ratio is insignificant in Column (6).
As for firm's economic characteristics variables, company's size (Assets) and stock price performance (Return) are positively related to CEO total pay. Book-to-market ratio (Btm), an inverse measure of investment opportunities, and leverage (Leverage) are negatively related to CEO total pay. Moreover, firms with multiple consultants (Multiple Consultants) have higher CEO pay (Kabir and Minhat 2014) .
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The coefficients on CEO-related variables indicate that while older CEOs receive lower pay, the CEO who is also the board's chairman receives greater pay.
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
Correcting for Potential Sample Selection Biases
In this section, we examine the incentives of compensation consultants on CEO pay after we 6 If we additionally incorporate the indicator variable on whether the consultant works exclusive for the board (Board Engagement) in Equation (1), we could expect the negative coefficient on Board Engagement because board-engaged consultants presumably have less to gain by recommending generous pay than they would if they work for management (Murphy and Sandino 2010) . However, including both consultant selection variables, Board Engagement and Multiple Consultants in a single equation model might result in high multicollinearity problem (correlation = -0.92). To avoid the problem, we only incorporate one variable regarding the consultant selection process. If we replace Multiple Consultants with Board Engagement, the coefficient of Board Engagement is significantly negative in both Columns (1) and (2), further lending support to the repeat business incentive hypothesis. These findings, coupled with those of Chu et al. (2015) , that CEO pay is actually higher when the consultant exclusively works for the management or additional consultant is hired by the management stand in sharp contrast to unexpected findings in Murphy and Sandino (2010). address potential sample selection biases that may impact our conclusions. We note that there are three potential sample selection issues underlying the results presented in Table 3 . First, as described in Table 1 , about 16 percent of firm-years (616 firm-years out of 3,814 firm-years) has dropped from our final sample since these firms do not use compensation consultants during our sample period, suggesting that we need to control for the prior decision to retain a consultant (Cadman et al. 2010) . Consistent with Cadman et al. (2010) who use a Heckman model to control for this selection issue, we control for the first-stage hiring decision of a consultant by following a Heckman model discussed in Cadman et al. (2010) . In untabulated findings, we confirm that controlling for the first-stage hiring decision does not significantly change our conclusions presented in Table 3 . 7 Second, mandatory disclosures of EC and non-EC consulting fees under some circumstances (e.g., Figure 1 ) discussed in Section 3 presents some challenges in interpreting our results in Table 3 . To circumvent the new disclosure requirements, firms may strategically avoid Non-EC services that exceed $120,000. Firms may switch to specialist consultants who do not provide any non-EC service. Firms may allocate the EC and non-EC services into separate consultants.
Furthermore, some results presented in Table 3 are subject to selection bias. For example, the results presented in column (4) are based on a sub-sample of 576 firm-years whose EC fees are disclosed in proxy statements. A majority of these 576 firm-years (368 firm-years) are mandated to disclose EC fee information since they receive non-EC service of more than $120,000 from the same consultant. It is possible that firms that must disclose fee information because of having 7 Consistent with Cadman et al. (2010) , we find that CEO ownership percentage is negatively associated and the number of compensation committee meetings is positively associated with the decision to hire a compensation consultant. In addition, as the number of committee member increases, the number of business segment increases, and CEO tenure decreases, the firm is more likely to retain compensation consultant. The pseudo R 2 of our probit estimation is 0.213 which is much higher than that of Cadman et al. (2010) . their EC consultants provide other service after the new rules could be fundamentally different from other firms. For example, these firms continue to hire its EC consultant for non-EC service because they are more willing to compromise consultant independence for rent-seeking (Cadman et al. 2010) or conversely these firms that stayed with multi-service consultants are likely to have hired multi-service consultants for reasons unrelated to rent-seeking (Chu et al. 2015) . Murphy and Sandino (2010) , in their propensity-matching analysis of consultant conflicts of interest, find that larger, underperforming firms are more likely to be ones who have consultants provide other services.
While there is little theory to guide us what factors are associated with a decision to have their EC consultants provide other service to the firm, we employ a Propensity Score Matching analysis and compare the mean CEO total pay between EC Fee disclosure group (576 observations) and the non-disclosure group (2,622 observations). Appendix C provides details on a logit model used to find propensity scores.
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Panel A in Table 4 shows no significant difference between CEO total pay between EC Fee disclosure group (treatment group) and non-disclosure group (control group). This univariate analysis suggests that it is difficult to conclude that EC fee disclosure choice drives CEO pay (t-stat. = 0.42).
Third, the association between consultant incentives and CEO pay could vary across the mandatory versus voluntary disclosure groups. As seen from Panel B of Table 1, our final sample includes a substantial number of firms disclosing EC and non-EC fee voluntarily when 8 We use a propensity-score matching methodology to account for observable variables that may impact the board's decision to disclose EC fee (Rosenbaum 2002) . We begin our tests by modeling each of these choices through a logistic regression as shown in Appendix C. The model is statistically significant with a pseudo R 2 of 0.097. The probability of disclosing EC fee is increasing in firm size and whether CEO is chairman of the board and decreasing in the prior year's stock return, CEO tenure, and whether the CEO is new to the position. Next, we estimate propensity scores for each firm using predicted probabilities from the logit model. We then match each treatment firm to the closest control, after imposing the constraint that the matching firm selected be within a distance of 0.0058 (equals to 0.05 times standard deviation of the propensity score) of the treatment firm's propensity score to guarantee the similarity of the observable variables between the treatment and control samples. they are not mandated to do so since their EC consultants do not provide other services or a separate EC consultant is engaged by management. If voluntary EC and/or non-EC fee disclosers intend to signal that their engagement with a consultant and associated fees are unrelated to managerial rent-seeking motives, we would expect that including voluntary fee disclosers bias against our findings presented in Table 3 . Consequently, we are not very concerned about that including the voluntary fee disclosers result in a bias toward our conclusions regarding disclosed fees and CEO pay. Nevertheless, we re-estimate the equation (1) using a sub-sample with mandatory fee disclosures and report our findings in the Panel B of Table 4 . In Column (1), we use a modified NEC Service indicator which is one if firms mandatorily disclose their non-EC fees (368 observations) and zero otherwise (2,830 observations). In Column (2), we use modified non-EC fees with zero assumption, representing that NEC Fee equals to non-EC fee amount only if firms are mandatory disclosers (368 observations), otherwise NEC Fee is zero. Results presented in Columns (3) through (6) are based on 368 observations of mandatory fee disclosures only.
As indicated in the Column (1) to (6), only EC fee level is positively related to the CEO total pay, suggesting that consultants appear to recommend higher CEO compensation only when they have incentive to secure their existing business (repeat business incentive), whereas cross-selling incentive does not prevail in our sample. That is, the relationship between EC fees and CEO compensation continue to hold, regardless of whether disclosed fee information is voluntary or mandatory. Moreover, when our sample is restricted to mandatory fee disclosures, the limited evidence of cross-selling incentives in Table 3 disappears. [Insert Table 4 About Here]
Result for the Impact of EC Fees on CEO Cash and Equity Pay
So far, our evidence provides only limited evidence that the provision of non-EC services by EC consultant is related to CEO pay. In contrast with prior studies, however, we find robust evidence supporting that consultants' retention incentives to secure lucrative EC service (repeat business) may contribute to biasing their pay advice. Consequently, we further examine whether the EC fee levels can explain variations in CEO pay components, Cash Pay and Equity Pay.
Columns (1) and (2) provide empirical results for the entire EC fee disclosure sample (based on 576 observations), suggesting that both cash and equity pay are positively related to the level of EC fees. If we restrict the sample to mandatory EC fee disclosures, only CEO equity pay is positively related to the EC fees, as indicated in Column (4). Overall, the results are similar to the findings in Table 3 , which show support for the repeat business hypothesis.
[Insert Table 5 About Here]
Analysis of the Determinants of Executive Compensation Consulting Fees
The audit literature suggests that auditors' incentives to deter biased financial reporting differ systematically, depending on whether their clients pay more or less than the normal level of audit fee (Kinney and Libby 2002; Choi et al. 2010) . Consistent with the literature that interprets audit fee residuals as auditor rents that may impair auditor independence (Defond et al. 2002; Choi et al. 2010; Hope and Langli 2010; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010) 9 , we estimate the expected EC fees and fee residuals based on determinant model of EC fees and additionally test whether our results supporting repeat business hypothesis are driven by abnormally high EC fees paid. Since there is limited theory and prior research to guide us regarding the determinants of compensation consulting fees, we adopt and modify the determinant model of audit fees (Defond et al. 2002; 9 Recent research such as Doogar et al. (2015) , however, argue that audit fee residuals are a combination of auditor rents and unobserved audit production costs and that interpreting fee residuals as a measure of auditor rents is problematic. Choi et al. 2010; Hope and Langli 2010; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010) 10 by reflecting the models to retain a compensation consultant in prior research (Cadman et al. 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012) and estimate the following exploratory model of EC fee determinants as follows:
EC Feet = α0 + α1ln(Assets)t + α2ln(Employees)t + α3Roat + α4Leveraget + α5Btmt + α6Sales Growtht + α7Board Engagementt + α8Multiple Consultantst
In estimating the determinants of EC consulting fees to construct a measure of abnormal EC fees, we employ firm's consultant, economic, and CEO characteristics. The demand for EC consulting services is likely to increase with firm size, leading to a positive association between firm size and EC fees. We include firm's total asset (Assets) and the number of employees (Employees) to control for client size. Since consultants charge higher EC fees for risky clients (Simunic and Stein 1996) , we include Roa and Leverage to proxy for a client's risk characteristics. In addition, the demand for consultant services is greater for high-growth firms than for low-growth firms (Choi and Wong 2007 Table 6 presents the estimation results of Equation (2) where the natural logarithm of EC Fee is the dependent variable. In line with increasing demand for larger firms and growth firms, we find a positive coefficient on ln(Assets) and a negative coefficient on Btm. The coefficient of
Leverage is positive, suggesting that compensation consultants are likely to demand higher fees for financially distressed firms since evaluating CEO performance in financially distressed firms could be more challenging. Compensation committee meeting (Committee Meet) is positively related to EC fees, indicating that more diligent committee supports the purchase of differentially higher-quality consulting services, resulting in higher EC fees. Moreover, we find that board engaged consultant (Board Engagement) is paid more. Pay design complexity (Cda Words) is positively related to EC fees as pay design complexity requires more service hours from the consultants. CEO ownership percentage is negatively associated with EC fee since greater CEO ownership reduces agency problems thus decreasing the need for more complex pay plans. A new CEO requires a new pay design, so fees will increase when a new CEO is appointed.
Although the adjusted R-squared, 0.358, is smaller than that of conventional audit fee determinants, it provides a reasonable explanatory power to obtain abnormal EC fee metric.
[Insert Table 6 About Here]
Analysis of the Impact of Abnormal Executive Compensation Consulting Fees on CEO Pay
Using the estimated coefficients from Equation (2), we compute the fitted values of the EC fees and use them as "normal EC fees." We obtain the residuals (Residual) from individual annual estimations of Equation (2) 
CEO Payt
where: CEO Pay is Total Pay, Cash Pay, or Equity Pay.
Equation (3) uses the same control variables as in Equation (1), except the key independent variable is the positive and negative abnormal EC fees calculated from Equation (2 The regression results from Equation (3) are shown in Table 7 . Consistent with our expectation, the findings in Columns (1) through (3) indicate that positive abnormal EC fees are significantly associated with CEO's total and cash pay, whereas negative abnormal EC fees have no impact on CEO pay. This evidence is consistent with the previous evidence on the relation between EC fees and CEO pay being driven by positive abnormal EC fees and not by negative abnormal EC fees. Again, this result supports the repeat business hypothesis. Consultants are concerned about that the client will not retain the consultant for future EC services especially when they can derive higher revenue for a given amount of effort. These concerns can lead them to bias their recommendation in favor of the CEOs, resulting in lucrative pay packages. The sign and significance of all other control variables are consistent with those in Table 3 .
We also consider an alternative method for estimating Equation (2) as part of our sensitivity checks. We estimate Equation (2) after deleting the voluntary fee disclosures and re-examine the effect of abnormal EC fees on CEO pay as shown in Columns (4) to (6). The results remain similar and continue to support the repeat business hypothesis.
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[Insert Table 7 About Here]
Further Analyses
Alternative Proxy for Repeat Business Incentives
We use a different proxy for repeat business incentive of consultants as a robustness test. Cadman et al. (2010) develop the variable Percent Client Size, which equals the percent of assets that the client represents relative to the sum of total assets of all of the consultant's clients in the 11 Column (6) shows that positive abnormal EC fee is also positively associated with equity compensation using restricted sample of mandatory EC fee disclosures.
sample.
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This variable captures the relative importance of the particular client to a consultant, quantifying the repeat business incentives of a consultant. Untabulated results present that when we additionally include Percent Client Size in Equation (1) where the dependent variable is CEO total pay, the coefficient on EC Fee remains positively significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient on Percent Client Size is negatively significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that the relative importance of clients is inversely related to the CEO total pay, a result inconsistent with repeat business incentive hypothesis. 13 These results imply that our proxy EC Fee is more accurate and powerful in capturing repeat business incentives than the indirect proxy for repeat business incentives, Percent Client Size used by prior research.
Excluding Financial Firms
Another possibility is that financial firms are fundamentally different from non-financial in terms of CEO pay, CEO characteristics, firm economic characteristics, and compensation committee characteristics. The results remain unchanged after we exclude financial firms from our sample. Specifically, the association between EC Fee and CEO total pay remain significant at the 1 percent significance level and the variables related to the cross-selling hypothesis are all insignificant.
Other Robustness Tests
As further robustness tests, we use alternative types and definitions of control variables to confirm our results. Existence of a founder CEO, number of business segments, and big compensation consultant variables do not significantly alter the main findings of the study, while they only change the statistical significance of other control variables. We also adopt a different 12 Cadman et al. (2010) provide the numerical example regarding the variable construction. "If a consultant retains three clients, with total assets of $100 million, $200 million, and $700 million, then PCT equals 0.1, 0.2, and 0.7, respectively." model to test the impact of abnormal EC fees on CEO pay by including an interaction variable between abnormal fees and a positive abnormal fee indicator variable (Choi et al. 2010) .
Untabulated results show similar results to those in Table 7 with a significance level of interaction variable between abnormal EC fee and a positive abnormal EC fee dummy) on CEO total pay regression decreasing to the 10 percent level.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine whether compensation consultants' own incentives affect the CEO pay level, by utilizing consulting fee data accessible through the SEC's 2009 regulation. We hand-collect 3,198 consultant engagement information and 576 EC fee and 433 non-EC fee data from firms' annual proxy statements from fiscal year 2009 to 2011. Our results on the impact of compensation consultants' incentives on the level of CEO pay are consistent with consultants recommending higher CEO pay when they receive higher EC fees, thus supporting the repeat business hypothesis. We, however, find limited evidence that the level of CEO pay is higher when non-EC fees are higher, not generally supporting the cross-selling incentives. In order to examine whether our results on the relation between EC fees and CEO pay are driven by abnormal EC fees, we estimate the determinants of EC fees and analyze the relationship between abnormal EC fees and CEO pay. Consistent with abnormal EC fees increasing consultants' incentive to bias their pay recommendations, our regression results indicate that positive abnormal EC fees are significantly associated with CEO's total and cash pay.
This study contributes to the executive compensation literature in several ways. First, by extending the studies on the role of compensation consultants, this study fills the void in the literature on a significant participant in designing executive compensation packages. While prior research has addressed factors related to firm economics, governance, and executive characteristics, direct evidence on outside consultants has been scarce until now. Furthermore, this study challenges the findings of prior studies on the relation between conflicted compensation consultants and CEO pay (Conyon et al. 2009; Cadman et al. 2010; Murphy and Sandino 2010) with more direct proxies for consultants' incentives and provides novel evidence consistent with repeat business incentives motivating consultants to bias their advice.
Consultants are concerned about that the client will not retain the consultant for future EC services especially when they can derive higher revenue for a given amount of effort. These concerns can lead them to bias their recommendation in favor of the CEOs, resulting in lucrative pay packages.
The limitations of our study provide opportunities for future research. First, although our results hold after controlling for various selection biases arising from a decision to retain compensation consultants, a decision to have their EC consultants provide other service to the firm, and firms that voluntarily disclose their EC and non-EC fees, we are unable to completely rule out the possibility that our results could be clouded by sample selection issues. Second, in line with the audit literature that interprets audit fee residuals as auditor rents, we interpret EC fee residuals as consultant rents associated with economic bonding between a consultant and a firm. Fee residuals, however, may simply capture noise and unobserved EC consulting costs.
APPENDIX A Definition of Variables
Variables Description NEC Service = 1 if firm retains non-executive compensation service from the same compensation consultant who serves executive compensation service, 0 otherwise; NEC Fee = non-executive compensation service fees;
EC Fee = executive compensation service fees; Total Fee = sum of executive compensation service fees and non-executive compensation service fees (= NEC Fee + EC Fee); Fee Ratio = ratio of non-executive compensation service fees to executive compensation service fees (= NEC Fee / EC Fee); Residual = actual ln(EC Fee) minus expected ln(EC Fee) estimated in Equation (2) New CEO = dummy variable indicating change in CEO during the year; Assets = total assets; Leverage = total debt divided by total assets; Btm = book-to-market ratio at fiscal-year-end; Roa = return on assets (net income minus income from discontinued operation divided by beginning of the year assets); Loss = 1 if return on assets (Roa) has a negative value, 0 otherwise; Return = monthly compounded annual stock return; Return Volatility = standard deviation of monthly compounded annual stock returns (Return) over five years (t-5 to t-1); Sales Growth = sales growth (percent sales change from the prior year); Foreign = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax, otherwise; Biz segment = number of business segments; Employees = number of employees; Committee Size = number of compensation committee members; Committee Independence = fraction of outside directors on total number of compensation committee members;
Committee Busy = percent of directors holding three or more directorships; Committee Meet = number of meetings held by compensation committee; and Committee Tenure = average tenure of compensation committee members.
APPENDIX B An Example of Compensation Consultant Disclosure
Following is an example of compensation consultant engagement and consulting fee information disclosed in 2010 proxy statement of Motorola Solutions, Inc.
Independent Consultant Engagement
The Committee engages an independent consultant to advise them on the Company's compensation strategy and program design. The consultant conducts an in depth evaluation of our compensation program on a periodic basis (typically every one or two years), and annually reviews the specific compensation of our CEO and our senior leadership team, including our NEOs. 0.097 Z-statistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests, respectively. The dependent variable EC Fee Disclosure is 1 if firm discloses EC fees, 0 otherwise. 
FIGURE 1 2009 SEC Fee Disclosure Requirement
The SEC requires the companies to disclose fees earned by providing both executive compensation and non-executive compensation services under certain circumstances. Specifically, if the board or the compensation committee engages its own compensation consultant to provide advice or recommendations on the design of executive compensation, and if the consultant or its integrated affiliates provide services other than executive compensation consulting to the company, then disclosure of the fees related to all services provided are required given that the fees for services the NEC services is more than $120,000. If the board and the company's management engage separate compensation consultants, then no disclosure is required (SEC 2009 a This classification whether firms should disclose their EC fee and non-EC fee is assumed that the receive non-EC service of more than $120,000. If the non-EC fee of the firms do not exceed $120,000, no fee disclosure is required. are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests, respectively. Please refer to the paper for a detailed explanation of these tests. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) analysis is done by using the regression model in Appendix C. In Panel B, tstatistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests, respectively. The CC 0.643 0.353 0.681 0.307 T-statistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests, respectively. Please refer to the paper for a detailed explanation of these tests. 0.358 T-statistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests, respectively. Please refer to the paper for a detailed explanation of these tests. 299 T-statistics are reported in parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm. To mitigate any undue influence from outliers all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percentile. The symbols *, **, and *** correspond to 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests, respectively. Residual is actual ln(EC Fee) minus expected ln(EC Fee) estimated in Equation (2). Positive Residual is the residual value (Residual) which has a positive value and 0 otherwise. Negative Residual is the residual value which has a negative value (Residual) and 0 otherwise. Please refer to the paper for a detailed explanation of these tests.
